
An internationally important cluster for IT security research and development is established in Darmstadt. It is here where computer scientists, engineers, physicists, legal experts and experts in business administration of TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT and Hochschule Darmstadt (University of Applied Sciences) develop trend-setting IT security solutions and prepare them in order to be commercially useful. All involved partners qualify students and scientists for careers in science, business and administration. Headquarters of that cluster is the
Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt (CASED) which receives funds by the LOEWE program of the government of Hessen. The funds of LOEWE cover infrastructure of CASED and cooperative CASED projects of cluster partners, i.e. TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT and Hochschule Darmstadt. In these projects the cluster develops applicable basic knowledge and IT security solutions. Thanks to its broadly-based position in regards to topics and competencies, the cluster and its headquarters CASED can realize especially complex projects efficiently and sustainably. The Security Engineering group is involved in projects on data privacy and the security of future Internet services.
Funded by: LOEWE, Hessische Landes-Offensive zur Entwicklung Wissenschaftlich-ökonomischer Exzellenz
Partner: Several groups at TU Darmstadt, Fraunhofer SIT, Hochschule Darmstadt and Kassel University
Period: 1.7.2008 - 30.6.2014
Contact: Melanie Volkamer



Users can access an astonishing range of services through the web, ranging, for example, from product reviews and online shopping to online banking. However, despite a decade of intensive research in web security, it remains difficult for many end users to use these services securely: A host of threats endanger their privacy or lead to monetary losses. The key reason is that individual security mechanisms to mitigate these threats - such as HTTPS and PKIs - are only suboptimally integrated within the web ecosystem of web pages, web browsers, and end users. As a result, existing mechanisms are imprecise and require a substantial amount of expertise on the part of the end users, who consequently see warnings within the web browser as a nuisance.
In InUse, the expertise of the partners in the fields of usable security (CASED), legal sciences (Universität Kassel), IT auditing (usd), and digital identity (Kobil) enables the project to strive for an integrated approach to mitigate web security threats. The project particularly aims to improve the precision of end-user decision support and warnings, and to increase the effectiveness of the respective communication with end users. Moreover, for a holistic approach, the project also covers the legal aspects that govern the implementation of the mitigations, the technical challenges to protect sensitive personal data related the mitigations, and the auditing of web pages as a basis for risk evaluations.
Funded by: Gefördert durch Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz aufgrund eines Beschlusses des Deutschen Bundestages
Partner:
CASED,
University of Kassel,
usd and
Kobil
Period: 1.02.2012 - 31.01.2015
Contact: Steffen Bartsch, Project webpage

The focus of this project is on improving secure email communication with respect to social and usability aspects. The project will address two different areas:
Funded by: Horst Görtz
Partner: CASED (particularly Research Area "Secure Data" and Partner Project "Crypto and Society")
Period: 1.09.2011 - 30.08.2014
Contact: Cristian Thiago Moecke
Verifiable and in particular End-to-End verifiable electronic voting systems have been discussed at cryptography conferences for many years. As these processes are highly complex, they have so far been rejected as unreasonable for laymen. Instead, "black box voting systems" are used as for example in the Estonian parliamentary election. These are user-friendly but voters cannot verify the reliability and performance of the latter. In this regard, they therefore have to trust developers, operators and administrators.
Since 2009 the situation has started to change: on the one hand because of the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court demanding verifiability for voters and on the other hand because of the fact that with the Helios voting system, for the first time, a cryptographic voting protocol has been (prototypically) implemented. This voting system was, for example, tested at two universities and at the
IACR election. However, user studies (
Weber,2009) show that for an average voter the
Helios system is still not usable.
Additionally, the project will be looking at whether and how already existing e-voting systems can be improved in view of verifiability. Here, the project will focus on
Polyas and the
Estonian Internet voting system.
Funded by: Micromata GmbH one of
CASED - Premium Partners (see also
here)
Partner: CASED - Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt
Period: 1.1.2011 - 31.12.2013
Contact: Maina Olembo
The aim of this project is to find the legal and technical measures to fulfill the requirements for the Internet-voting schemes, which were defined in the first phase of the ModIWa project. In interdisciplinary collaborations between practical/theoretical Computer Science and Researchers from the legal department, first, concrete technical solutions should be found. These would implement the design recommendations that are established for the main project using the KORA method. For this purpose, the already existing internet protocols based on the criteria derived from KORA and the design recommendations will be evaluated. Other opportunities will also be sought that fulfill the criteria and design recommendations. A particular focus of the Computer Science will consist of the evaluation of cryptographic methods, which have gained importance in secret as well as public elections. Through the continuation project, the work on reference model for the design and evaluation of Internet voting procedures will be completed and deepened. Upon completion of the project, a comprehensive and systematic concept for the legal-and technology-friendly design of Internet voting will be available.
Funded by: DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Project manager: Prof. Dr. Johannes Buchmann, Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Grimm, Prof. Dr. Alexander Roßnagel and Dr. Melanie Volkamer
Partner: Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Grimm, University Koblenz-Landau (
link to his project page) and Prof. Dr. Alexander Roßnagel, Kassel University (
link to his project page)
Period: Two years
Contact: Melanie Volkamer
Electronic voting machines have been in use since 1999 in Germany for parliamentary elections. This electronic election support is indispensable in relation to the very complex local election laws in many areas, as the manual counting of votes is prone to errors, time-consuming, and therefore also very expensive. On March 3rd 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court declared as unconstitutional the electronic voting machines that were previously used as well as the Federal Voting Machine Ordinance, as not all voting machine principles, which are of relevance according to constitutional law, were taken into consideration. In doing so, the Court emphasized that this statement did not apply as a matter of principal to electronic elections. The objective of this project is to ascertain how electronic elections and, in particular, verification procedures can be realized in a constitutionally compliant manner. To enable this, comprehensive legal and technical requirements were defined, formulation proposals for voting machine regulations were created, and a constitutionally compliant voting machine was developed, which, in addition to handling the submission of votes and the calculation of results, could also authenticate voters. An adequate evaluation concept was also drafted to support all of this. Such a legal and informational foundation for constitutionally compliant electronic parliamentary elections can only be provided if the planned cooperation between jurists and computer scientists is established.
Funded by: DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Project manager: Prof. Dr. Johannes Buchmann, Prof. Dr. Alexander Roßnagel and Dr. Melanie Volkamer
Partner: Prof. Dr. Alexander Roßnagel, Kassel University (
link to his project page)
Period: 1.1.2011 - 31.12.2012
Contact: Melanie Volkamer and Jurlind BudurushiDenise Demirel

The goal of this project is to make the individual verifiability part of End-to-End verifiable voting systems usable for large scale legally binding elections. To do so, individual verifiability mechanisms will be analyzed and improved in regard to usability aspects ideally without decreasing the security. The project focuses on the open source
Helios remote electronic voting system and its individual verifiability mechanisms . The general goal is to further develop the research on usable security in the context of electronic voting. Thus, the project is strongly related to the Usable Verifiability in Remote Electronic Voting project.
Funded by: DAAD, Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst
Partner:
Lorrie Cranor and
CUPS
Period: 1.5.2011 - 31.8.2011
Contact: Melanie Volkamer